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Individual differences in working memory capacity are related to performance on a range of 
elemental and higher order cognitive tasks. The current experiment tests the assumptions 
of two theoretical approaches to working memory capacity: working memory as executive 
attention and working memory as temporary binding. These approaches are examined using a 
short-term updating task where proactive interference is manipulated, such that old responses 
have to be suppressed in favour of new responses. A second source of distraction is introduced 
by way of irrelevant, to-be-ignored background speech that accompanies presentation of the 
list items. This speech reinforces either the to-be-remembered item on the current list, or 
the to-be-suppressed item. Working memory capacity was significantly related to overall level 
of correct performance on the short-term task, and to the degree of proactive interference 
experienced. However, there was no evidence for individual differences in the ability to suppress 
the interfering foil, nor in priming effects associated with the irrelevant speech. The results 
provided little support for the working memory capacity as executive attention perspective, 
some evidence for the binding perspective, but also evidence supporting the fact that some 
effects of distraction are not under voluntary control.
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In 1974, Baddeley and Hitch suggested that working memory was a fundamental substrate of all cognitive 
activity. Subsequent research has confirmed that performance on working memory tasks shares substantial 
variance with both higher order and more elemental cognitive tasks. In recent times the emphasis has 
shifted to understanding individual differences in working memory capacity (WMC). Wilhelm, Hildebrandt 
and Oberauer (2013), for instance, have suggested that there are three broad approaches to understanding 
WMC: WMC as executive attention, WMC as Primary Memory and Secondary Memory, and WMC as binding. 
The current experiment is developed to compare the executive attention and binding approaches using a 
short-term cued recall task where resistance to proactive interference (PI) and resistance to distraction are 
manipulated.
The executive attention view of working memory is empirically based on working memory capacity 
differences across a range of distraction tasks such as dichotic listening tasks (Conway, Cowan, & Bunting, 
2001), the antisaccade task (Unsworth, Redick, Spillers, & Brewer, 2012), and flanker tasks (Heitz & Engle, 
2007). The attentional control account of WMC argues for a limited pool of attentional resources “whereby 
memory representations are maintained in a highly active state in the face of interference” (Kane & Engle, 
2002, p. 638). This definition has been interpreted in two ways: capacity can be focused upon the target 
item such that distractors are not processed, or it can be used to inhibit or supress distractor activity. In sub-
sequent research, Miyake et al. (2000) suggested that executive attention could divided into three separate 
but related factors, these being shifting, updating, and inhibition factors. Later research led Friedman and 
Miyake (2004) to subdivide the inhibition factor into a further three subsets involving pre-potent responses 
inhibition, as in the Stroop task; resistance to distraction from interference, as in the effects of irrelevant 
stimuli in tasks such as the flanker task; and in resistance to PI. Individual differences in WMC have been 
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linked to all three forms, but the current paper is concerned primarily with resistance to PI and to distraction. 
Importantly, those who have high WMC show less PI in a range of memory tasks (Kane & Engle, 2002; Kliegl, 
Pastotter, & Bauml, 2015). The relationship between capacity and resistance to distraction is less clear with 
some studies showing a significant relationship between the two constructs (Unsworth, 2010) and others 
showing no significant relationship (Keye, Wilhelm, Oberauer, & van Ravenzwaaij, 2009).
According to the binding approach (Oberauer, Süß, Wilhelm, & Sander, 2007; Wilhelm et al., 2013), WMC 
reflects the ability for building, maintaining, and updating temporary bindings. For example, in memory for 
lists of words that involve multiple trials, items have to be bound to contextual elements such as “the cur-
rent list” and/or “position within the list”. In some tasks, such as the n-back and running memory span tasks, 
these temporary bindings need to be continually updated. Thus, the formation of rapid temporary bindings 
“enables the system to construct and maintain new structures, such as random lists… the limited capacity 
of working memory arises from interference between bindings…” (Wilhelm et al., 2013, p. 4). Wilhelm et al., 
argued that updating tasks are the most appropriate measures of WMC because they involve all three bind-
ing functions: the formation and maintenance of new structures and the updating of those structures.
In the current study we examined attention and binding approaches using a short-term cued recall 
updating task. PI was manipulated within a single trial rather than across distinct trials as is typically the 
case in other PI paradigms. In this task (Tolan & Tehan, 2002) each trial consists of a small number of items, 
one (target) of which is a member of a taxonomic category. At test the category label is presented as a cue for 
recall of the relevant target. The list items are organised into a single block of four items on a small number 
of trials and more frequently into two blocks, the first containing four words and the second containing 
five words. In each case the instructions stressed that participants are to remember the items in the most 
recently presented block. PI is manipulated in this paradigm via the presentation in the to-be-forgotten first 
block of another member (foil) from the same taxonomic category as the target item in the second block. 
The effects of PI emerge in suppressed recall of the target item and in the enhanced recall of the to-be-
forgotten foil, relative to performance on a no-interference condition where the target is the only instance 
of the taxonomic category in the list. The two-block trials are effectively an updating task, where participants 
remember some items for a brief period of time and then are asked to forget those items and remember 
the next set of items. From the binding perspective, participants form a temporary structure, the first block, 
and then when it is apparent that the task is a two-block trial, they forget the old structure and create a new 
temporary structure, the second block.
Two studies have explored individual differences in working memory capacity on the cued recall task 
(Friedman & Miyake, 2004; Unsworth, 2010), but neither involved all possible measures, and both studies 
employed a retention interval of eight seconds instead of the immediate test used in the current experi-
ments. Friedman and Miyake (2004) compared performance on one-block trials to performance on no-inter-
ference two-block trials to measure interference, and Unsworth (2010) used performance on the one-block 
trials as a measure of no-interference and lure recall as the measure of interference. Both experiments 
reported that individual differences in working memory capacity, as measured by multiple complex span 
tasks, were related to resistance to proactive interference.
Irrelevant speech is the second factor that is manipulated in the current experiment. We will refer to the 
irrelevant speech effect in this paper, acknowledging that the irrelevant speech effect represents a specific 
instance of the more general irrelevant sound effect (Beaman & Jones, 1997). The irrelevant sound effect 
represents the detrimental effect that background sounds have on short-term, serial recall of visually pre-
sented items, even when instructions stress that the sounds should be ignored (Jones & Macken, 1993). 
Such auditory distraction is maximised if the auditory stream contains changing state sounds rather than a 
single, repeated, steady-state sound; an outcome that is known as the changing-state effect (Jones, Madden, 
& Miles, 1992). In the current experiment we have adopted changing-state speech as the auditory distractor 
to involve the language system. We are interested in the effects that semantic and phonological features of 
the auditory distractors have on short-term recall, rather than the sensory features of the distractors.
Both attention and binding explanations of the irrelevant speech effect have been proposed. The attention 
control account assumes that changing state auditory input captures attention, and diverts resources from 
the primary memory task. Psychophysiological evidence using event-related potentials have supported such 
a view (Bell, Dentale, Buchner & Mayr, 2010), as has the demonstration that participants can habituate to the 
auditory stream (Röer, Bell, & Buchner, 2014). One important aspect of the attention account is that content 
similarity between the two streams should have little impact upon performance as it is attention capture 
that is the locus of the effect. Secondly, the approach does not automatically lead to specific predictions con-
cerning the frequency with which different types of errors should be made. If high capacity participants are 
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more able to focus attention on the target or alternatively, to suppress distractor activity, one might expect 
that there would be better target recall. Our reading of the theory is that it does not make any predictions 
concerning the frequency of different types of errors.
The binding account of irrelevant speech effect assumes that temporary bindings between contextual 
elements and items are disrupted by irrelevant speech. Much of the literature associated with the irrelevant 
speech effects involves item to order bindings, but Bell, Röer, and Buchner (2013) have shown that item to 
background colour bindings are just as susceptible to irrelevant speech as item to order bindings. Tolan and 
Tehan (2002), using the cued recall task described earlier, showed that PI effects, both in terms of dimin-
ished target recall and increases in foil recall, were more prevalent under irrelevant speech conditions than 
quiet conditions. Thus, irrelevant speech disrupted the item to block-2 context bindings such that on a 
number of trials, the foil in block-1 was incorrectly recalled.
Tolan and Tehan (2002) explored another aspect of irrelevant speech. They manipulated the content of the 
irrelevant stream to modulate the degree of PI. They were able to demonstrate that the auditory distractors 
could essentially prime either the target item or the interfering foil in the cued recall paradigm. When the 
speech supported the target item, performance was immune to PI, target recall was excellent and there were 
few block-1 intrusions. However, when the auditory items supported the foil, target recall was depressed and 
the foil was frequently recalled instead of the target. Their explanation for these effects involved the interac-
tion of phonological and semantic codes in semantic memory (Tehan, Humphreys, Tolan & Pitcher, 2004; 
Tolan & Tehan, 2002). An emergent prediction from their explanation is that these between-stream priming 
effects are obligatory and are not under attentional control. This prediction has yet to be tested.
Individual differences in the strength of the irrelevant speech effect have been the focus of a considerable 
amount of research (see Sörqvist and Rönnberg, 2014, for a review). This literature confirms that those who 
have high capacity are less susceptible to irrelevant speech on many tasks, especially those that involve 
attention capture. Importantly, Beaman (2004) found that high WMC participants were less likely to show 
positional intrusion errors from previous lists in an immediate serial recall task than low WMC participants. 
This suggests that WMC is related to the frequency of PI errors as well as target recall.
However, there is one key feature of the irrelevant speech effect that is not related to WMC. Those who 
have high working memory capacities are just as susceptible to the changing state irrelevant speech effect 
as those with low working memory capacities (Beaman, 2004; Sörqvist, Marsh, & Nöstl, 2013). This suggests 
that some aspects of the irrelevant speech affect are not under attentional control.
In the current experiment, individual differences in WMC on the Tolan and Tehan (2002) task are examined 
under conditions where the irrelevant speech primes either the target item or the to-be-forgotten foil. From 
the executive attention perspective, those who have high WMC should be resistant to PI either through 
focusing purely upon the target recall or alternatively, they are better at suppressing distractors. High capac-
ity participants should be immune to the effects of PI. Likewise, if auditory distractors are suppressed or 
not processed, the irrelevant speech priming effects should not be evident. From the binding perspective, 
those with high working memory capacity should be better on the updating task which would be reflected 
in better target recall, fewer omissions, and perhaps fewer block-1 intrusions (Beaman, 2004). However, 
the approach is silent about priming effects and what would happen if binding breaks down and the foil is 
recalled. The Tolan and Tehan (2002) account makes the prediction that priming effects are an emergent 
feature of the cognitive architecture that supports short-term recall and as such are obligatory and not sus-
ceptible to individual differences in either attentional control or binding.
Methods
Participants
Participants were 80 undergraduate psychology students at the Australian Catholic University, who 
participated for partial course credit.
Materials
The materials and procedure used by Tolan and Tehan (2002) were utilised and are fully described in that paper. 
The cued recall component of the experiment consisted of 12 one-block trials and 40 two-block trials that were 
randomly ordered. The structure of the critical two block trials and the corresponding auditory distractors is 
presented in Figure 1. The critical two-block trials consisted of four words in the first block and five words in the 
second block. The two blocks were separated by an exclamation point (!) and the category cue presented in capi-
tal letters followed the end of the second block prompting recall. On all trials a single target item (in Figure 1 
cat) was presented among fillers in the most recent block. Proactive interference was manipulated on 20 trials 
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by including a second item (foil – dog) from the same category as the target in the first block. An example of an 
interference trial would be: house, apple, dog, watch ! tree, cloud, cat, book, nail ANIMAL. The other 20 trials were 
no-interference trials, in which the foil was replaced with a filler (pen). There are three measures of performance 
on this task: correct recall of the target, omissions where the target is not recalled (and nor is the foil), and false 
recall of the foil that appeared in the first block. Data from our lab indicates that twenty minute test-retest reli-
ability estimates for the three measures are .65, .65 and .50 for target, omissions and lures, respectively.
All the cued recall trials were studied in the presence of background speech. The irrelevant speech consisted 
of a string of 18 words, five of which shared phonological features with either the target or the foil. These 
five items were presented in positions 12 to 16 in the irrelevant stream. Two of the five key irrelevant speech 
items shared the same stem as the foil or target, two shared the same rhyme ending and one shared the 
same consonants. An example of the critical irrelevant speech items supporting the target word, cat, were 
cab, hat, cot, can, and mat. The irrelevant speech supported the foil on 10 of the interference trials and on 
10 of the no-interference trials (although the foil was not actually present for these no-interference trials). 
Similarly, the speech supported the target on 10 of the interference trials and 10 of the no-interference trials.
The individual difference manipulation consisted of a modified operation span task in which words and 
math problems [e.g., (3 4) – 1 = 10] were presented in pairs. Participants read the word (and attempt to 
remember it) and then processed the mathematics problem. After all pairs were presented participants 
attempted to recall the words in the order in which they were presented. The current procedure deviated 
from the standard span methodology in that each trial consisted of four word/maths problems (fixed list 
length), and there were eight trials in total. Unpublished research from our laboratory has indicated that 
eight fixed-length trials of four words produces the same level of reliability as a 20-trial, span procedure 
starting with four trials at two words and finishing with four trials of six words. The twenty-minute test-
retest reliability estimates were .79 and .87 for the maths and memory component respectively.
Procedure
All participants were presented with the cued recall task first. Participants were instructed on the structure 
of the test and were told that they were to remember the most recent block of items. On the two-block trials 
a block-separator (!) was used to indicate that the trial was a two-block trial and that the participants should 
Figure 1: Structure of a standard trial with to-be-remembered items in the centre column, and irrelevant 
speech conditions on the outsice columns.
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forget the first block and concentrate on the second block as it was this block that contained the target 
item. The items on each trial were presented at a rate of one item per second in the centre of a computer 
screen. The category cue was presented immediately after the final item for two seconds and the participant 
had 12 seconds to respond before the next trial began. During this period, participants could change their 
response if they chose to, but such events were extremely rare. At the start of the trial, the irrelevant speech 
commenced and finished with the presentation of the category cue. Participants were told to ignore the 
auditory material as best they could.
In the operation span task, the words/math problem on each trial were visually presented at a rate of 
three seconds per work/maths problem pair. Participants read each word aloud and then processed the 
maths problem. Following presentation of all pairs, a row of question marks appeared and the participant 
attempted serial recall.
Results
In scoring the operation span task, two measures were generated. The first involved scoring an item as 
correct only if it was recalled in the correct serial position (order scoring). The second involved a free recall 
criterion, in which an item was scored as correct if it was recalled at all, irrespective of which position it was 
recalled in (item scoring). Internal consistency estimates were higher for the item scoring,  = .75, than for 
order scoring,  = .65, and consequently later analyses are based upon the item score. Table 1 presents the 
correlations between working memory measures and total scores on the cued recall task, including correct 
target recall, omissions, and recall of the block-1 foils. The correlations of WMC with the four individual 
types of cued recall trials showed identical outcomes to the total scores. Those who performed well on the 
working memory task also performed well on the cued recall of the target and made fewer omission errors. 
However, working memory scores were not significantly related to foil intrusions.
Two complementary sets of analyses were undertaken to assess the role of working memory capacity. In 
the first instance, a frequently used extreme groups design was employed to directly compare those with 
high working memory capacity with those low working memory capacity. In this design, the upper and lower 
quartiles of a distribution of WM span scores are categorized as high and low span, respectively. While this 
design has a number of strengths, it also has weaknesses (see Conway et al., 2005, for a review), not least that 
data from half the participants are not used, and continuous capacity variable is turned into a categorical 
variable with the consequent loss of specificity. To overcome these potential problems, our complementary 
ANCOVA used data from all participants and working memory capacity was used as a continuous variable. In 
this analysis, the variance due to working memory capacity was first extracted with the remaining variance 
then being analysed. Under these conditions, effects that are influenced by WMC should be severely attenu-
ated as reflected in smaller F values and, more importantly, in diminished effect sizes.
Performance on the cued recall task is summarised in Table 2. The data replicate Tolan and Tehan’s (2002) 
finding that target recall was better in the no-interference condition than in the interference condition. 
Irrelevant speech also had an impact in that when the irrelevant speech supported the foil, target recall was 
depressed and false recall of the foil was enhanced relative to the conditions where the speech supported 
the target item.
The cued recall target and omission data were first analysed by means of 2 (WMC)  2 (PI)  2 (irrelevant 
speech) mixed design ANOVAs. Likewise, the foil data were analysed via a 2 (WMC)  2 (irrelevant speech) 
ANOVA that compared the two conditions that contained interfering foils. In both instances planned 
Table 1: Descriptive statics for and correlations between working memory measures and performance on 
the cued recall task.
Mean SD (Range) WM Ord WM Item Cued Total Omission 
Total
WMOrder 10.79 4.42 (3–25)
WMItem 15.25 4.41 (6–26) .79
Cued Total 21.11 7.19 (5–35) .49 .53
Omissions Total 12.70 6.43 (0–34) –.38 –.47 –.86
Foil Total 4.16 2.08 (0–10) –.11 –.04 –.32 –.12
Note: WM Ord = operation span order scoring, WMItem = operation span item scoring, Cued Total = total targets recalled, Omissions 
Total = neither target nor foil recalled, Foil Total = Total block-1 foils recalled instead of target. Correlations in bold font are significant 
at p = .05.
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comparisons involved direct assessment of proactive interference and speech priming effects for both high 
and low working memory capacity groups.
The outcomes of the overall ANOVA presented in Table 3 and the outcomes of the planned comparisons 
are presented in Table 4. For target recall, high working memory capacity participants recalled more targets 
than the low capacity group, target recall was better when the speech supported the target than the foil, 
and target recall was better in the no interference condition than the interference condition. There was a 
group by interference interaction, but not a group by speech priming interaction. As Table 4 indicates, there 
were strong interference effects for the high working memory capacity group but not for the low working 
memory capacity group. Both groups showed speech priming effects that were of a similar magnitude. The 
ANCOVA (see Table 3) indicated that working memory capacity accounted for all interference effects, but 
there were still strong speech priming effects.
The results for the omission data were largely the mirror of the target outcomes. Low capacity participants 
made more omissions than those in the high capacity group, there were more omissions in the interfer-
ence condition than the no interference condition, and there were more omissions made when the speech 
supported the foil than when it supported the target. The planned comparisons indicated that interference 
effects were not present for the high capacity group, but were for the low capacity group. Again speech 
priming effects were present in both groups and of a similar magnitude. The ANCOVA indicated that work-
ing memory capacity accounted for all the omission effects. That is, the differences in the proportion of 
omissions were fully explained by individual differences in working memory capacity.
In contrast to the other measures, high and low capacity groups did not differ in the number of foil intru-
sions. The intrusions were more frequent when the speech primed the foil than when they primed the tar-
get, and, as Table 4 indicates, this was true of both groups. The ANCOVA again confirmed that strong speech 
priming effects were still present after the effects of working memory capacity had been partialled out.
Discussion
The cued recall paradigm permitted the examination of individual differences in WMC on two potential 
sources of interference within the one trial, PI and irrelevant speech. The outcomes of the experiment con-
verge on five findings. Firstly, target recall was related to WMC. Those who performed well on the working 
memory component of the task also recalled the target item on the cued recall task more frequently than 
the low WMC participants. Secondly, and paradoxically, the superior ability of the high WMC group to recall 
the target, meant that they were more susceptible to PI than the low WMC group. To a large extent the low 
WMC group showed that they were not able to resolve competition between the target, auditory distrac-
tors and other list items resulting in high levels of omission errors. Thirdly, the ANCOVA analyses confirmed 
the role of WMC in PI, to the extent that PI effects in target recall were eliminated, as were the frequency 
of omissions across all experimental conditions, when variance in WMC had been partialled out. Fourthly, 
Table 2: Mean performance on the cued recall task as a function of working memory capacity (WMC), 
proactive interference and irrelevant speech priming.
WMC Interference Speech Priming
Target Foil
Target Recall
High WMC Interference 6.71 (1.93) 5.24 (2.30)
No Interference 8.24 (1.09) 5.76 (2.14)
Low WMC Interference 5.35 (1.70) 2.39 (2.10)
No Interference 5.30 (2.40) 3.09 (2.11)
Omission Errors
High WMC Interference 2.10 (1.51) 1.62 (1.32)
No Interference 1.76 (1.09) 3.10 (1.76)
Low WMC Interference 3.35 (1.80) 3.91 (2.04)
No Interference 4.35 (2.06) 4.70 (2.18)
Foil Recall
High WMC Interference 1.14 (0.96) 3.00 (1.61)
Low WMC Interference 0.83 (0.98) 3.52 (1.92)
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omissions and foil intrusions were not correlated and differences in capacity had no impact upon recall of 
the interfering foil. Lastly, the irrelevant speech priming effects were present in the data for both target and 
foil recall that were independent of WMC. In short, individual differences in WMC were reflected in the abil-
ity to remember the target item, but were not related to either foil recall or irrelevant speech priming effects.
From a theoretical perspective, the executive functioning account of WMC argues that high capacity 
participants are better able to focus on the target item by either supressing distractors or not processing 
these distractors (Kane & Engle, 2002). Irrelevant speech effects were present in the data and high WMC 
participants were better able to focus on the target item, an outcome that is consistent with the execu-
tive attention approach. There was less supporting evidence for the suppression of distractors. Irrelevant 
speech priming effects should not have emerged if the irrelevant stream had been suppressed. Likewise, 
there should have been correlations between WMC and foil intrusions if there were differences in ability to 
Table 3: ANOVA outcomes for target recall, omission errors and foil intrusions as a function of working 
memory capacity (WMC), proactive interference, and speech priming.
High V Low WMC WMC as Covariate
F (1,41) p ηp
2 F (1,78) p ηp
2
Target
WMC 26.30 <.001 .39 30.86 <.001 .28
PI 12.18 .001 .23 .12 .734 .01
Speech Priming 81.27 <.001 .67 28.97 <.001 .27
WMC * PI 4.94 .032 .11 1.67 .200 .02
WMC * Priming 1.47 .232 .04 3.58 .062 .04
PI * Priming 0.03 .862 .01 1.12 .296 .01
WMC * PI * Priming 3.01 .090 .07 1.47 .229 .02
Omissions
WMC 18.11 <.001 .31 22.16 <.001 .22
PI 16.10 <.001 .28 .94 .334 .02
Speech Priming 11.25 .002 .22 2.39 .126 .03
WMC * PI 0.84 .365 .02 .01 .916 .00
WMC * Priming 0.01 .938 .00 .07 .790 .01
PI * Priming 2.59 .115 .06 .13 .718 .00
WMC * PI * Priming 4.76 .036 .10 1.57 .215 .02
Foil
WMC 0.00 .992 .00 .10 .750 .00
Speech Priming 56.25 <.001 .58 22.30 <.001 .22
WMC * Priming 1.86 .180 .04 3.47 .066 .04
Table 4: Comparisons of interference and speech priming effects for High and Low WMC groups on target 
recall, omissions and foil intrusions.
Proactive Interference Speech Priming
t p Cohen’s d t p Cohen’s d
Target
High WMC 4.13 .001 .74 6.51 <.001 1.20
Low WMC 0.88 .389 .13 6.46 <.001 1.32
Omissions
High WMC 1.33 .198 .34 2.63 .016 .30
Low WMC 5.47 <.001 82 2.17 .041 .21
Foil
High WMC 4.47 <.001 1.19
Low WMC 6.12 <.001 1.80
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suppress the foil. However, priming effects were evident and WMC was independent of foil recall, a finding 
that is at odds with Unsworth’s (2010) findings of a correlation between foil recall in the cued recall task an 
WMC, and Beaman’s (2004) finding of a similar correlation involving the frequency of prior-list intrusions. 
One possible explanation for this discrepancy involves the content of the irrelevant speech. In the Unsworth 
experiment irrelevant speech was not manipulated, and in Beaman’s study, the content of the irrelevant 
speech was not manipulated. Manipulating the content of the irrelevant speech enhances the production of 
the block-1 foils to much higher levels than normal (Tolan & Tehan, 2002), suggesting that other processes 
are involved in the production of the foil. The current outcomes do confirm recent suggestions that there 
are boundary conditions to attentional control and susceptibility to distraction (Meier & Kane, 2015).
The results are more consistent with the binding account of WMC (Oberauer et al., 2007). According to 
this account high capacity participants are better at forming and maintaining new temporary structures 
(Wilhem et al., 2013). In the current task, these new structures would involve information about the items in 
the most recent block. In this task, not only do participants have to create and update new structures across 
trials, they have to update and create new structures within a trial. Given the task instructions, the binding 
operations in the PI task revolve around updating what the current target(s) are. As such target recall is the 
locus of where individual difference effects should be observed and it is where they were found.
Our interpretation of this approach is that it is silent about what happens when such binding breaks down. 
Our data provides some insight into the processes involved. WMC completely accounted for the omission 
data when there are breakdowns in the maintenance of the current structure (see Marsh, Sörqvist, Hodgetts, 
Beaman, & Jones, 2015, for other instances of WMC effects on target recall and current structure errors). 
However, WMC was not related to the degree of cross talk between old and new structures as reflected in 
foil intrusions, an outcome that is at odds with the notion that it is competition among bindings that is 
the locus of individual differences. The binding account is currently silent about sources of distraction that 
are not integral to the formation and maintenance of new temporary structures. It is not apparent how the 
binding approach would explain the irrelevant speech priming effects in particular, or more general chang-
ing state irrelevant speech effects (Beaman, 2004). How irrelevant speech interferes with the maintenance 
of temporary structures remains to be elucidated, but Bell et al. (2013) suggest that the irrelevant speech 
diverts attention away from the binding of an item and its context, and the maintenance of such bindings.
While we think the data are more consistent with the binding account, it is not certain that the two 
accounts are mutually exclusive. Many of the tasks that have explored distraction effects from the executive 
attention account do not rely upon the formation of item-to context bindings for discriminative purposes, 
but rather in the speed of item processing. In the cued-recall task the formation, updating and maintenance 
of temporal bindings is an essential component of the task. It is quite possible that differences in attentional 
control could result in stronger initial bindings, faster or more complete updating, better maintenance of 
such bindings, or all three processes. Thus, in this task, attentional control is not about item activation, but 
context to item bindings as suggested by Bell et al. (2013).
The fact that irrelevant speech priming effects were unrelated to and unaffected by individual differences 
in WMC, strongly indicates that these effects are largely not subject to attentional control. We have argued 
previously (Tolan & Tehan, 2000; Tehan et al., 2004) that these priming effects are an emergent property of 
the interaction of phonological and semantic features of items in a composite semantic memory where fea-
tures of different items in the episode contribute to the construction of any given memory, whether those 
items are central to the memory task or are peripheral to it. As such the current priming effects (and chang-
ing state effects) are obligatory. The assertion that phonemic and semantic codes interact is not unique to 
the specific explanation here. Similar interactions in semantic memory have been proposed to account for 
speech production errors (e.g., Dell & Reich, 1981), priming in sentence recall (e.g., Schweppe, Rummer, 
Bormann, & Martin, 2011), and specific patterns of neuropsychological deficits (e.g., Martin, Lesch, & Bartha, 
1999).
We have argued that our results address the relationship between working memory capacity, proactive 
interference and auditory distraction. While there is a considerable history of studies where performance 
on the operation span task has been the basis for inferences regarding the relationship between working 
memory capacity and other cognitive abilities, it is clear that no single working memory task, including 
the operation span task, is a pure measure of working memory capacity. Relying upon a single measure of 
verbal working memory, rather than a latent measure derived from multiple measures of working memory, 
represents a limitation of the current research. As such, the role of working memory capacity in proactive 
interference and auditory distraction in the cued recall task awaits confirmation with a more diverse range 
of complex span tasks from which a latent measure of working memory capacity can be obtained (Foster, 
Shipstead, Harrison, Hicks, Redick, & Engle, 2015).
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The current experiment tested the widely held view that a defining function of working memory is the 
ability to protect cognitive activity from distraction. We show that WMC was related to the ability to form 
and maintain temporary episodic bindings that permitted the participants to isolate one episodic event. We 
also show that some forms of distraction are not under attentional control but are an emergent property of 
the cognitive architectures that support the recall process.
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